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MENDING HOLES IN THE RULE OF
(ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW
Evan J. Criddle
The past decade has witnessed a surge of interest in Carl Schmitt‘s
controversial assertion that the rule of law inevitably bends under the demands of state necessity during national emergencies. According to
Schmitt, legal norms cannot constrain sovereign discretion during emergencies because ―the precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated‖ in
advance.1 The sovereign must therefore possess unfettered discretion to determine both ―whether there is an extreme emergency‖ and ―what must be
done to eliminate it.‖2
Few legal scholars have embraced Schmitt‘s theory of emergencies
with the enthusiasm and sophistication of Adrian Vermeule, the John H.
Watson, Jr. Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. In an article published recently in the Harvard Law Review, Vermeule argues that American
administrative law is fundamentally ―Schmittian‖ in the sense that it permits federal agencies to operate outside the constraints of administrative
procedure and meaningful judicial review during emergencies.3 Vermeule
contends that the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is replete
with procedural exceptions, which generate ―black holes‖—zones where
federal agencies are free to act outside the constraints of legal order.4 In
addition, he suggests that federal courts manipulate flexible legal standards
to accord heightened deference to federal agencies during national crises,
transforming standards such as ―reasonableness‖5 and ―good cause‖6 into
―grey holes‖—legal devices which preserve the façade, but not the reality,
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CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 6
(George Schwab trans., University of Chicago Press 2005) (rev. ed. 1934) (link).
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Id. at 7.
3
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009)
(link).
4
Id.
5
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(holding that courts interpreting ambiguous federal statutes ―may not substitute [their] own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency‖) (link).
6
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (providing that agencies need not comply with the APA‘s provisions for informal rulemaking where ―the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest‖) (link).
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of the rule of law.7 Far from criticizing these gaps in federal administrative
law, Vermeule accepts black and grey holes as institutional inevitabilities,
and dismisses proposals to extend the rule of law to all administrative action as a ―hopeless fantasy.‖8
Vermeule makes a compelling case for his observation that statutory
loopholes and anemic judicial review have diminished administrative law‘s
salience during national emergencies. But his broader argument, that black
holes and grey holes cannot be eradicated, is unpersuasive and deeply
troubling. In reality, Congress could eliminate the APA‘s procedural loopholes without compromising agencies‘ capacity to act during emergencies
if it would simply discard the APA‘s rule-based categorical exceptions in
favor of a more nuanced, standard-based derogation regime. Likewise, federal courts could easily eliminate grey holes by treating legal standards in
administrative law as vehicles for promoting robust public justification of
administrative action. The primary obstacle to these reforms is not ―institutional,‖ as Vermeule asserts, but rather cultural: too many legislators and
judges view administrative law in static positivist terms as a means for allocating decision making authority among public institutions, rather than in
dynamic relational terms as establishing a regime in which public officials
must justify all exercises of administrative powers according to publicregarding factors.
To show how our administrative law might be reformed to promote a
―culture of justification,‖9 this essay advances a relational theory of the rule
of law based on the principle that public officials and agencies serve as fiduciaries for the public. Whereas Vermeule‘s article explores the current
limits of our administrative law, the relational theory suggests practical
steps for refining our legal system to ground emergency administration
more firmly in the rule of law.
I. IS SCHMITTIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INEVITABLE?
In defending his Schmittian theory of administrative law, Vermeule
takes aim at legal scholars such as David Dyzenhaus who ―praise the rule of
law and aspire to extend law‘s empire to encompass even emergency policymaking by the executive.‖10 The aspiration to apply administrative law in
emergencies is ―hopelessly utopian,‖ Vermeule argues, because Congress
and the courts lack the institutional resolve necessary to subject the Execu-

7

Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1096.
Id. at 1105.
9
See Etienne Mureinik, Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 1977, 1986 (1994) (book review) (characterizing South African law in the early 1990s as ―a struggle between a culture of authority and a culture of justification‖) (link).
10
Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1101.
8
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tive Branch to the ―thick‖ rule of law.11 Although Vermeule concedes that
―one could imagine a system of administrative law that is minimally
Schmittian or even not Schmittian at all,‖12 he contends that such a system
is not feasible in practice because Congress will never agree to close the
APA‘s procedural loopholes and because courts will inevitably dial down
the APA‘s flexible standards to maximize executive discretion in emergencies.13 For these reasons, ―[t]he exception cannot, realistically, be banished
from administrative law; exceptions are necessarily built into its fabric.‖14
Few would dispute Vermeule‘s observation that the APA‘s procedural
provisions are littered with loopholes, and I will not belabor this point.15 To
the extent that the APA‘s categorical exceptions and definitional quirks
punch holes in administrative law‘s fabric, thereby allowing public officials
to operate outside the constraints of ordinary administrative procedure,
Vermeule might be right to characterize our administrative law as Schmittian in a minimalist sense.16
Vermeule‘s more ambitious claim that black holes cannot be purged
from our administrative law is less persuasive. Even if we accept Vermeule‘s assertion that Congress lacks the requisite institutional incentives to
impose ordinary procedural requirements on agencies during emergencies,
it does not follow that Congress could not redesign the APA‘s emergency
regime to eliminate black holes. If ordinary administrative law is too burdensome, Congress could design malleable procedural requirements to accommodate agencies‘ legitimate concerns for speed and efficiency without
abandoning procedural restraints altogether during national crises. Or Congress could require agencies to develop their own ad hoc administrative
procedures for emergencies, subject to broad congressional standards and
judicial review. Such measures would eliminate the procedural loopholes
Vermeule identifies without sacrificing agencies‘ operational flexibility.
The fact that such procedures do not currently exist reflects a lack of initia11

Id. at 1097. Vermeule defines ―‗rule by law‘ (or the thin rule of law)‖ as ―compliance with
whatever duly enacted positive laws there happen to be. By contrast, the ‗rule of law‘ (or the thick rule
of law) requires more than compliance with whatever duly enacted laws there happen to be; it also requires adherence to a broader set of principles of legality, most famously expressed by Lon Fuller.‖ Id.
at 1101.
12
Id. at 1105.
13
Id. at 1132–33.
14
Id. at 1104.
15
In most contexts, of course, federal agencies will be subject to constitutional constraints such as
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause—and thus will not fall entirely outside the rule of law—even
when they operate within one of the APA‘s statutory loopholes. Recognizing this fact, Vermeule does
not argue that black holes are common, only that they exist, and that their existence is inevitable. Id. at
1117–18.
16
Schmitt himself defends a much more aggressive theory of emergency administration, arguing
that during emergencies the Executive is sovereign and thus wields ―the highest, legally independent,
underived power.‖ SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 17; see also id. at 9–12 (linking the concept of sovereignty to article 48 of the German constitution of 1919, which granted emergency powers to the president).
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tive and imagination within the broader legal community rather than a fatal
flaw in Congress‘s institutional structure.
Just as Vermeule fails to demonstrate that Congress lacks the institutional capacity to eliminate the APA‘s black holes, he does not make a persuasive case that federal courts are institutionally predestined to convert the
APA‘s flexible standards into grey holes. To be sure, experience suggests
that federal judges on both sides of the political spectrum tend to accord
administrative agencies heightened deference when applying flexible legal
standards during emergencies.17 In most cases, however, heightened deference to public officials during national emergencies is consistent with the
application of substantive legal standards such as ―reasonableness‖ and
―good cause.‖ If the Executive provides a reasonable justification for its
approach to a crisis, judicial deference to that choice of approach is a far cry
from the type of de facto abstention that would render judicial review a
farce.
While this distinction between heightened judicial deference and de
facto abstention is admittedly slippery, it is remarkable that virtually every
case Vermeule cites in his discussion of grey holes follows a path of reasoned deference rather than de facto abstention. Far from simply taking
agencies‘ legal and factual assessments at face value, lower courts in the
post-9/11 cases Vermeule identifies undertook a robust review of agency
actions, identifying substantial evidence supporting the agency‘s position
and articulating a detailed explanation for upholding the agency‘s decision.18 None of these courts withheld meaningful review, generating the
type of invidious grey holes that Dyzenhaus and others have criticized as
anathema to the rule of law.
Of course, one need not accept Vermeule‘s characterization of particular judicial decisions as ―grey holes‖ to appreciate the intense political pressures federal judges experience as guardians of legal order during
emergencies. As long as our administrative law depends upon flexible legal
standards, courts will be tempted to distort those standards during emergencies in deference to the Executive Branch. Eliminating black holes and
placing greater reliance upon broad legal standards might only increase the
opportunities and political pressures for judicial abstention, an insight
Vermeule attributes to Schmitt.19 In this respect, the Schmittian challenge
to our administrative law will always be with us. Yet numerous post-9/11
decisions suggest that rigorous judicial review of agency action is not ―in17

See, e.g., Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (―Surely we must recognize
that courts are likely to accord a claim of military necessity greater deference during a major war than
would be proper years later when the emergency is long past . . . .‖) (link).
18
See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (link); Jifry v.
Fed. Aviation Admin. 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (link); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (link).
19
Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1135.
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stitutionally impossible‖20 and that the public need not necessarily resign itself to the inevitability of executive and judicial lawlessness during national
crises. The critical question is not whether black holes or grey holes are
unavoidable (they are not), but rather how administrative law can best advance the rule of law project prospectively.
While Vermeule endeavors to map the institutional limits of administrative law, in the end his article speaks most forcefully to the limits of positivist accounts of the rule of law. For lawyers like Schmitt and Vermeule,
who view administrative law in purely positivist terms, black and grey
holes serve primarily to allocate legal authority among governmental institutions and are jurisprudentially problematic only insofar as their mechanics
and systemic repercussions are poorly understood.21 This impoverished
conception of administrative law lacks the resources necessary to explain
what the rule of law is, or should be, in our republic. To answer this question, we need a more robust vision of the rule of law than Vermeule‘s
Schmittian theory can supply.
II. COMMON-LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM REVISTED
Vermeule properly identifies Dyzenhaus‘s account of ―common-law
constitutionalism‖ as the most rigorous alternative to Schmitt‘s emergency
theory.22 Dyzenhaus argues that law should govern emergency administration, and that the rule of law should be understood as ―a rule of fundamental
constitutional principles which protect individuals from arbitrary action by
the state.‖23 These principles include both procedural norms, such as the
right to notice and a hearing before public power is wielded to affect private
interests and substantive values such as non-arbitrariness. Such principles
are ―constitutional‖ in the sense that they are constitutive of legal order itself, and are thus necessary for any legal system that claims to satisfy the
rule of law. Public officials and institutions cannot violate the rule of law‘s
constitutive principles in emergencies without undermining their own claim
to moral and legal authority.24 Authority might make law, as positivists assert, but the rule of law‘s constraints make authority.25
Public justification plays a central role in Dyzenhaus‘s common-law
constitutionalism. Building on the work of the late South African jurist
Etienne Mureinik, Dyzenhaus argues that the ―the constraints of legality are
20
Id. Curiously, Vermeule dismisses the jurisprudence of both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit as aberrational without seriously considering whether the more robust review performed in
these courts undercuts the Schmittian account or might serve as a model for other federal courts in
emergencies. Id. at 1126, 1133-34.
21
Id. at 1143–49.
22
See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
(2006).
23
Id. at 2.
24
See id. at 4–5.
25
Id. at 12.
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the constraints of adequate justification.‖26 The rule of law dictates that
public officials must provide reasons for their actions during emergencies,
and these reasons must be consistent with the fundamental principles of legal order.
On this account, administrative law serves as the rule of law‘s handmaid, laying the groundwork for meaningful public justification by cultivating
governmental deliberation, transparency, fairness, reasonableness, and integrity. Traditional administrative procedures such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking facilitate public justification by compelling agencies to articulate objectively reasonable, public-regarding justifications for their policy
choices.27 Upon judicial review, agencies must also persuade courts that
their actions have a reasonable legal and factual basis, and courts, in turn,
must publicly justify their own rulings based on relevant legal principles.
By ensuring that those who exercise public powers satisfy the rule of law‘s
constraints, the practice of public justification serves as both the currency of
public legitimacy and the guardian of legality within the administrative
state.
Critics have argued that Dyzenhaus‘s conception of the rule of law is
too nebulous to guide public officials during emergencies. In one recent article, for instance, Thomas Poole has rejected Dyzenhaus‘s project as an
―exercise in wish fulfillment.‖28 Although Poole admits feeling drawn to
the idea that the common law contains ―deep, transcendental values,‖ he
laments that ―when we look for [these values], we do not quite know where
to find them.‖29 The common law tradition is a poor foundation for the rule
of law, Poole argues, because ―[i]t is the capaciousness of common law, its
normative ‗give,‘ that is paradigmatic, not the solid core of relatively unchanged normativity the common law constitutionalists imagine.‖30 In
short, even if we accept Dyzenhaus‘s conception of the rule of law as a rule
of reasons, the common law tradition arguably lacks the normative clarity
needed to specify which reasons are adequate to justify state action.
One promising approach for shoring up the normative foundations of
common-law constitutionalism focuses on the fiduciary character of public
administration.31 By virtue of their legally entrusted authority, all public
26

David Dyzenhaus, Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture, 14 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 11, 30 (1998); see also Mureinik, supra note 9, at 1986 (describing ―the central
aspiration of law‖ as the pursuit of ―ever-better justification of decisions‖).
27
See Dyzenhaus, supra note 26, at 35.
28
Thomas Poole, Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law, 7 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 247,
266 (2009).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 268.
31
See Evan Fox-Decent, Democratizing Common-Law Constitutionalism, 55 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (link). For an argument that U.S. administrative law reflects a fiduciary model of state
legal authority, see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117 (2006) (link). For a general discussion of the fiduciary character of state legal authority, see Evan
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agencies and officials stand in a trust-like relationship toward persons subject to their administrative powers. Just as the common law places trustees
and other fiduciaries under legal obligations to honor their beneficiaries‘ legitimate interests, those who wield powers of public administration likewise
bear fiduciary obligations to treat their subjects fairly, reasonably, and nonarbitrarily for public-regarding purposes.32 Where feasible, public administrators must also engage in deliberative decision-making, and they must be
ready to provide reasons for their actions that are consistent with their fiduciary role.33 These basic fiduciary obligations of public service are legal obligations because they are rooted in and constitutive of the state-subject
fiduciary relation, and because fiduciary duties are legal duties.
Fiduciary duties are legal duties within the common law not by historical accident but instead because, in Kantian terms, they embody persons‘
moral capacity to place state actors under legal obligations. Evan FoxDecent and I have argued that Kant‘s legal conception of fiduciary relations
offers a sound theoretical foundation for attributing fiduciary obligations to
state actors.34 According to Kant, when parents unilaterally create a person
utterly dependent upon them for survival, they also assume fiduciary obligations to protect and care for their children. Recognition of a child‘s equal
freedom as a ―citizen of the world,‖ coupled with the child‘s practical or legal inability to consent to the relationship of dependence, places parents
under moral and legal duties to provide for their child‘s basic security by
making ―the child content with his condition so far as they can.‖35 By the
same reasoning, public officials bear fiduciary duties toward persons subject to their administrative powers because public powers are entrusted solely to the state by law, leaving the public vulnerable to the abuse of
administrative power. To ensure that such persons are not subject to domination or instrumentalization, the fiduciary principle dictates that all agents
and instrumentalities of the state bear legal obligations to discharge their responsibilities fairly and reasonably in the public interest.36
This relational account of common-law constitutionalism explains why
the rule of law is a rule of reasons, and it clarifies what kinds of reasons
count in public justification. To satisfy their demands of legality on Kant‘s
theory—establishing a regime of secure and equal freedom for all persons—public officials must demonstrate that their actions are consistent
Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN‘S L.J. 259 (2005) [hereinafter
Fox-Decent, State Legal Authority].
32
See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) (link).
33
Id.
34
See id.; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INT‘L L. 331 (2009) (link); Evan Fox-Decent, Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?,
27 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2008) (link); Fox-Decent, State Legal Authority, supra note 31.
35
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98–99 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
36
See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 34, at 347.
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with their fiduciary obligations and are not reflective of domination or instrumentalization. Where practicable, administrative agencies should employ deliberative decision-making procedures to minimize the risk of
arbitrariness, and they should open their decisions to public contestation.
Even when such measures are not practical due to circumstances of extreme
exigency, administrative agencies should justify their actions to the public
and the courts, explaining how their actions are consistent with the fiduciary obligations of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and transparency. All public officials must satisfy these principles
if persons subject to their administrative powers are to be taken seriously as
free and equal autonomous agents, not merely as objects of state domination or instrumentalization. The relational fiduciary theory thus disarms
Schmitt‘s critique of legal liberalism and Poole‘s critique of common-law
constitutionalism and offers a blueprint for promoting the rule of law in
emergencies.
III. MENDING HOLES IN THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW
By cataloguing the various Schmittian features of our administrative
law, Vermeule indirectly outlines an agenda for common-law constitutionalism in the twenty-first century. To establish the rule of law, legislators
and judges must work together to mend the black holes and grey holes
Vermeule identifies, developing new strategies to reconcile the demands of
state necessity with the rule of law in emergencies.
On the relational theory of common-law constitutionalism, federal
agencies must satisfy the rule of law in emergencies because arbitrary state
action in emergencies undermines the fiduciary character of state legal authority. This does not necessarily mean that Congress and the courts must
fill black holes with ordinary administrative procedure, as some commentators have suggested.37 Far from promoting the rule of law, slavish adherence to ordinary administrative procedures could compromise the statesubject fiduciary relation by preventing agencies from acting swiftly and effectively to safeguard subjects‘ secure and equal freedom. What the relational account of the rule of law does require, on the other hand, is that
Congress and the courts establish a legal regime for emergencies that compels federal agencies to justify their derogations from ordinary administrative law—not by reference to crude categorical rules, but instead by
reference to relational principles such as necessity, proportionality, fairness,
reasonableness, and transparency. Such an approach would preserve administrative flexibility during national crises while holding agencies to account for their fundamental fiduciary obligations.

37
See Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005); Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order?
The Rule of Lawmaking in the War on Terrorists, 64 LA. L. REV. 831 (2004).
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The APA‘s ―good cause‖ exception for notice-and-comment rulemaking provides a rudimentary model for the relational approach to administrative procedure, but Congress and the courts should specify the principles
that govern derogation from ordinary administrative procedure more clearly. For example, when agencies elect to abandon traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures, the APA could require that they give the
public contemporaneous notice, explaining why procedural derogation is
necessary and why their preferred decision making procedure is narrowly
tailored to the perceived emergency. Emergency regulations should also be
accompanied by a public statement explaining how the agency‘s substantive
regulation satisfies existing law, is proportional to the perceived emergency,
and promotes the public interest. Congress should also require agencies to
subject emergency regulations to more robust deliberative procedures as
soon as practicable after the crisis has passed, ensuring that emergency regulations adopted under conditions of uncertainty do not become ossified in
ordinary administrative law. In addition, Congress should expand federal
courts‘ jurisdiction to ensure that they are able to consider whether agencies
have satisfied their fiduciary obligations at each stage of the decision making process. Within this new regime, courts could still accord substantial
deference to an agency‘s assessment of an emergency and the agency‘s
choice of means to address it, but the courts would nonetheless consider
whether the agency‘s explanations are objectively reasonable and consistent
with the state‘s fiduciary role. Measures such as these would preserve the
Executive Branch‘s ability to respond to emergencies quickly and effectively, without entrenching emergency regulations in ordinary administrative
law or sacrificing the rule of law on the altar of state necessity. Equally important, these reforms are fully within Congress‘s institutional capacity.
The relational approach to emergency administration carries its own
risks, of course. If Congress were to develop a more sophisticated standard-based derogation regime for administrative procedure, it might eliminate black holes only to find that judges distort those standards to create a
new generation of grey holes. To the extent that our administrative law
draws on common-law constitutionalism to reconcile emergency administration with the rule of law, courts may be tempted to subvert the rule of
law by refusing to hold public officials accountable for their abuse of power.
Although grey holes are neither conceptually unavoidable nor institutionally inevitable, they may be difficult to eradicate in practice because
they reflect a powerful tradition within our legal culture that emphasizes the
thin ―rule by law‖ rather than the thick ―rule of law.‖ Efforts to mend these
holes expose a deep tension within our legal culture ―between lawyers who
think that the job of law is done when decisions are made by officials
wielding authority and lawyers who think that the law should strive for de-
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cisions that are justified.‖38 While positivist accounts of administrative law
such as Vermeule‘s Schmittian theory permit the Executive Branch to take
extra-legal action during emergencies, the relational account espoused by
Dyzenhaus, Mureinik, and other common-law constitutionalists ―lead[s] to
a culture of justification—a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified.‖39 The black and grey holes Vermeule identifies thus
require more than technocratic legal reform; they call for a fundamental
reorientation of our legal culture away from a focus on formal authority and
toward a more vigorous practice of public justification.
To be sure, the relational theory of common-law constitutionalism is
aspirational insofar as it relies on federal judges to apply legal standards as
vehicles for promoting public justification. Vermeule goes too far, however, when he characterizes the aspiration toward a culture of justification as
―fantas[tical]‖ or ―hopelessly utopian.‖40 Guided by the fiduciary character
of public administration, common-law constitutionalism offers a practical,
realistic roadmap for overcoming Vermeule‘s Schmittian challenge and establishing the rule of (administrative) law during emergencies.

38

Mureinik, supra note 9, at 1983.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 26, at 11 (quoting Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994)).
40
Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1097, 1105.
39
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